Tesla Wall Connector Charger Hacked | Through Charging Port in 18-Minute Attack

As the world speeds toward smart mobility and electric vehicle (EV) adoption, cybersecurity is often left in the rearview mirror. A recent discovery has raised significant concerns over the security of EV charging stations, particularly the Tesla Wall Connector Gen 3. Researchers demonstrated that a residential Tesla EV charger could be hacked through its charging port in just 18 minutes, opening the door to a wave of potential cyberattacks on smart infrastructure.

What Happened?

Security researchers identified a vulnerability in Tesla Wall Connector Gen 3, an AC EV charger designed for homes, hotels, and commercial buildings. This charger, capable of delivering up to 22 kW of power, was found to be susceptible to arbitrary code execution via physical access to the charging port.

Key Attack Highlights:

• The charging port served as an entry point for exploitation.

  
  

• Hackers used a Single-Wire Controller Area Network (SWCAN) — a non-standard protocol typically reserved for in-vehicle communication.

• The Control Pilot (CP) line, responsible for charger-to-car communication, was abused to send malicious signals to the internal software of the charger.

• Attackers achieved root access in under 18 minutes.

Why Is This Attack Alarming?

This isn’t just a tech geek’s hack. It’s a significant cybersecurity concern for smart cities, commercial buildings, and home users alike. Here’s why:

1. Compromised Private Networks

These chargers are typically connected to local networks for monitoring and updates. If compromised, hackers can pivot into private home or corporate networks, gaining access to devices, credentials, and surveillance systems.

2. Attack Surface Expansion

Every smart EV charger is now a potential attack vector. With the growing number of EVs and chargers globally, these become low-hanging fruit for cybercriminals.

3. Supply Chain Risk

This vulnerability demonstrates how insecure firmware or protocols in hardware devices can ripple across supply chains, affecting utility companies, energy grids, and smart home ecosystems.

Technical Breakdown of the Tesla Wall Connector Exploit

What Is SWCAN and Why Does It Matter?

SWCAN, or Single Wire CAN, is a protocol used for intra-vehicle communication, such as between ECUs and infotainment systems. It's rarely used in external applications, making its usage in a wall charger highly unusual — and potentially dangerous.

Using this protocol, hackers were able to:

• Inject commands directly into the firmware.

• Alter network behavior of the charger.

• Deploy backdoors into the connected infrastructure.

Implications for Smart Device Manufacturers

This breach isn’t just Tesla’s burden. It’s a wake-up call for all smart device manufacturers:

• Devices designed for physical safety and utility must not sacrifice digital security.

• The use of non-standard protocols needs thorough vetting and sandboxing.

• Firmware must be digitally signed, encrypted, and monitored for anomalies.

Best Practices to Prevent Such Attacks

For Manufacturers:

• Perform regular firmware security audits.

• Disable unused ports and interfaces.

• Implement role-based access control in firmware logic.

• Use encrypted communication protocols only.

For Users & Installers:

• Install EV chargers in physically secure areas.

• Keep firmware updated with official Tesla releases.

• Monitor charger network behavior with firewalls or VLANs.

• Avoid connecting chargers to unsecured or shared networks.

Final Thoughts

Smart charging infrastructure is a backbone of the EV revolution — but if left vulnerable, it can become the Achilles' heel of modern mobility. The Tesla Wall Connector exploit serves as a real-world demonstration that physical devices need the same digital security attention as servers or applications. It’s not enough to electrify — we must secure every volt.

FAQs

1. What is the Tesla Wall Connector Gen 3?

The Tesla Wall Connector Gen 3 is a residential AC electric vehicle charger capable of delivering up to 22 kW of power and commonly used in homes, hotels, and businesses.

2. How was the Tesla Wall Connector hacked?

Researchers exploited the charger’s Control Pilot (CP) line using a protocol called SWCAN to execute arbitrary code within 18 minutes.

3. What is SWCAN?

SWCAN stands for Single-Wire CAN, a non-standard communication protocol used in Tesla’s Wall Connector for managing charging communications.

4. What is the Control Pilot (CP) line?

The CP line is a signal line used to control communication between an electric vehicle and the charger during the charging process.

5. What type of vulnerability was exploited?

The attack exploited a firmware-level vulnerability allowing attackers to remotely execute code by accessing the charger’s port interface.

6. How long did it take to hack the charger?

Researchers demonstrated that the charger could be hacked in just 18 minutes.

7. What can hackers do after gaining access?

Attackers could potentially access private home or business networks, tamper with firmware, or use the charger as a pivot point for larger attacks.

8. Is this vulnerability specific to Tesla?

This specific flaw affects Tesla’s Wall Connector Gen 3 but highlights risks present in many IoT-based smart chargers.

9. Could this attack occur remotely?

While the initial vulnerability was local, with firmware backdoors or remote misconfigurations, it could be weaponized remotely.

10. What kind of data is at risk?

Sensitive user data, Wi-Fi credentials, charging history, and network access points could be compromised.

11. How can Tesla users stay protected?

Users should regularly update firmware, isolate chargers from sensitive networks, and monitor network activity.

12. Is there a patch available?

Tesla has not publicly released a patch as of the date of this blog, but security researchers have disclosed findings responsibly.

13. How is this different from traditional EV vulnerabilities?

This attack targets the charging hardware and software directly, rather than the vehicle or cloud interface.

14. Can this be exploited via public charging stations?

Yes, if a Tesla Wall Connector is installed at public locations, they are equally vulnerable unless secured properly.

15. What other devices use SWCAN?

SWCAN is primarily used in automotive applications like onboard diagnostics, but its use in chargers introduces new attack surfaces.

16. Can attackers brick the charger?

Yes, by corrupting the firmware or sending malformed packets, they could disable the charger.

17. Is physical access required?

Yes, physical access to the charging port or the internal components is needed for initial exploitation.

18. Can this attack impact the vehicle itself?

While the charger is the target, a compromised device may pose indirect risks to the vehicle’s battery management and communication systems.

19. Are hotels and businesses at higher risk?

Yes, due to less frequent updates and shared networks, commercial locations are often more vulnerable.

20. What role does firmware security play in this?

Firmware integrity is crucial; without secure boot and encryption, attackers can easily manipulate the device.

21. What is the potential impact of such an exploit?

Beyond individual risk, this could serve as an entry point to larger infrastructure attacks or botnet inclusion.

22. How common are EV charger hacks?

They are becoming increasingly common as EV infrastructure expands and cybersecurity measures lag.

23. Who discovered this vulnerability?

Security researchers presented the flaw in controlled environments for educational and awareness purposes.

24. Why is smart EV charger security important?

They are part of the growing IoT ecosystem and connect to homes, grids, and vehicles — making them high-value targets.

25. How should businesses secure their Tesla chargers?

Use isolated networks, disable unnecessary services, and apply vendor-recommended security controls.

26. What is code execution in this context?

It refers to the ability to run unauthorized commands or programs on the charger’s internal system.

27. Does Tesla offer bug bounty programs?

Yes, Tesla runs a bug bounty program encouraging researchers to report vulnerabilities responsibly.

28. Can this type of attack scale?

Yes, with automation or firmware replication, attackers could potentially exploit multiple devices at once.

29. Are non-Tesla chargers vulnerable too?

Potentially yes — any EV charger with network or protocol misconfigurations could be susceptible to similar attacks.

30. What should cybersecurity professionals learn from this?

Always evaluate embedded devices, secure communication protocols, and consider hardware-level risks in IoT systems.