Dangerous Active Directory Misconfigurations and How to Prevent Them
The most dangerous Active Directory misconfigurations are too many privileged accounts (especially in Domain Admins), service accounts with weak passwords that can be Kerberoasted, unconstrained delegation on servers, the same local administrator password on every machine, overly permissive permissions (ACLs) on users and groups, legacy protocols such as NTLMv1 and unsigned SMB, misconfigured certificate templates…
Topic: Active Directory & Identity Security in Cybersecurity & Ethical Hacking · Explainer
Quick answer: The most dangerous Active Directory misconfigurations are too many privileged accounts (especially in Domain Admins), service accounts with weak passwords that can be Kerberoasted, unconstrained delegation on servers, the same local administrator password on every machine, overly permissive permissions (ACLs) on users and groups, legacy protocols such as NTLMv1 and unsigned SMB, misconfigured certificate templates in AD Certificate Services, and stale or disabled-but-privileged accounts. Attackers chain these to move from one compromised laptop to full domain control. Prevent them with tiered administration, Windows LAPS, strong managed service accounts, regular audits and monitoring.
Key takeaways
- Fewer privileged accounts means fewer paths to domain compromise.
- Kerberoasting targets service accounts with weak passwords.
- Windows LAPS removes shared local admin passwords.
- AD Certificate Services misconfigurations can grant domain admin rights.
- Regular health checks find dangerous paths before attackers do.
Table of Contents
- Which AD Misconfigurations Are Most Dangerous?
- Why Are Service Accounts and Delegation Risky?
- How Do You Audit Active Directory?
- What Is Tiered Administration?
- What Should You Monitor?
- References
Which AD Misconfigurations Are Most Dangerous?
| Misconfiguration | Risk | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| Excessive privileged group membership | More accounts to steal for full control | Minimise and review Domain/Enterprise Admins |
| Weak service account passwords with SPNs | Offline cracking via Kerberoasting | Group Managed Service Accounts, long random passwords |
| Unconstrained delegation | Servers can impersonate any user who connects | Use constrained or resource-based delegation |
| Same local admin password everywhere | One compromise spreads to all machines | Windows LAPS |
| Overly permissive ACLs | Users can reset passwords or add members to admin groups | Audit and remove unnecessary rights |
| Legacy protocols (NTLMv1, unsigned SMB/LDAP) | Relay and credential attacks | Disable NTLMv1, require signing |
| Vulnerable AD CS templates | Users can request certificates as admins | Review templates and enrolment rights |
| Stale and privileged dormant accounts | Unmonitored entry points | Disable and remove regularly |
The 2024 multinational guidance on detecting and mitigating Active Directory compromises covers these techniques in depth.
Why Are Service Accounts and Delegation Risky?
Any domain user can request Kerberos service tickets for accounts with service principal names, and those tickets can be cracked offline if the password is weak (MITRE T1558.003). Unconstrained delegation lets a server store users' tickets, so an attacker controlling it can impersonate administrators. Use Group Managed Service Accounts and constrained delegation, and add admins to the Protected Users group.
How Do You Audit Active Directory?
# Members of Domain Admins (PowerShell, RSAT)
Get-ADGroupMember "Domain Admins" -Recursive | Select-Object Name, SamAccountName
# User accounts with SPNs (Kerberoasting exposure)
Get-ADUser -Filter {ServicePrincipalName -like "*"} -Properties ServicePrincipalName, PasswordLastSet
# Computers trusted for unconstrained delegation
Get-ADComputer -Filter {TrustedForDelegation -eq $true} | Select-Object Name
# Enabled accounts inactive for 90 days
Search-ADAccount -AccountInactive -TimeSpan 90.00:00:00 -UsersOnly | Where-Object Enabled
Free tools such as PingCastle produce AD health reports. Run audits only on domains you administer.
What Is Tiered Administration?
| Tier | Assets | Rule |
|---|---|---|
| Tier 0 | Domain controllers, AD CS, identity systems | Managed only from dedicated privileged workstations |
| Tier 1 | Servers and applications | Separate admin accounts |
| Tier 2 | Workstations | Admins never use higher-tier accounts here |
Microsoft's AD security best practices explain privileged access separation.
What Should You Monitor?
- Changes to privileged groups (event IDs 4728, 4732, 4756).
- Unusual Kerberos ticket requests for service accounts (4769 with RC4 encryption).
- New certificate templates or enrolments by unexpected users.
- Logins by admin accounts on workstations.
Poor credential hygiene and improper privilege separation are top issues in the NSA and CISA misconfigurations advisory. Related: common misconfigurations and insider threat detection. WebAsha offers Windows and Active Directory security training.
References
Frequently Asked Questions
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