Post-Quantum Cryptography: How It Works and How to Start Using It
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is a set of public-key algorithms designed to resist attacks from future quantum computers, while running on today's ordinary computers. A large quantum computer running Shor's algorithm could break RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography, which protect most internet key exchange and digital signatures.
Topic: Cybersecurity Foundations in Cybersecurity & Ethical Hacking · Explainer
Also covers: Cyber Threats, Scams & Online Safety
Quick answer: Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is a set of public-key algorithms designed to resist attacks from future quantum computers, while running on today's ordinary computers. A large quantum computer running Shor's algorithm could break RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography, which protect most internet key exchange and digital signatures. NIST standardised the first PQC algorithms in August 2024: ML-KEM (FIPS 203) for key establishment, and ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) for signatures. Hybrid key exchange combining classical X25519 with ML-KEM is already used by major browsers, and OpenSSL 3.5 supports the new algorithms. Organisations should start by inventorying where they use public-key cryptography.
Key takeaways
- PQC runs on classical computers; it is not quantum technology.
- Symmetric encryption such as AES-256 is not broken by quantum computers in the same way.
- "Harvest now, decrypt later" makes long-lived secrets a present-day concern.
- Hybrid TLS key exchange is already in everyday use on the web.
- Migration starts with a cryptographic inventory, not with buying products.
Table of Contents
- Why Do Quantum Computers Threaten Today's Encryption?
- What Is Harvest Now, Decrypt Later?
- How Do the New Algorithms Work?
- What Is Hybrid Key Exchange?
- How Can You Try PQC with OpenSSL?
- How Should Organisations Prepare?
- References
Why Do Quantum Computers Threaten Today's Encryption?
| Cryptography | Used for | Quantum impact |
|---|---|---|
| RSA, Diffie-Hellman, ECDH, ECDSA, EdDSA | Key exchange, signatures, certificates | Broken by Shor's algorithm on a large quantum computer |
| AES | Bulk encryption | Grover's algorithm weakens it; AES-256 remains strong |
| SHA-2, SHA-3 | Hashing | Modest weakening; larger outputs suffice |
Nobody has publicly demonstrated a quantum computer large enough to break real RSA or ECC keys, and estimates of when one might exist vary. Migration takes many years, which is why standards bodies started now. For the standards timeline, including NIST IR 8547's transition dates, see our article on quantum computing and encryption.
What Is Harvest Now, Decrypt Later?
An adversary can record encrypted traffic today and store it until a quantum computer can break the key exchange. Data that must stay secret for many years, such as health records, government information or long-lived intellectual property, is therefore already at risk. This is why key exchange is being upgraded first, before signatures.
How Do the New Algorithms Work?
| Standard | Algorithm | Purpose | Based on |
|---|---|---|---|
| FIPS 203 | ML-KEM (from CRYSTALS-Kyber) | Key encapsulation | Module lattices |
| FIPS 204 | ML-DSA (from CRYSTALS-Dilithium) | Digital signatures | Module lattices |
| FIPS 205 | SLH-DSA (from SPHINCS+) | Digital signatures | Hash functions |
Lattice schemes rely on the difficulty of solving noisy linear equations in high-dimensional lattices, a problem with no known efficient quantum algorithm. Hash-based signatures rely only on the security of hash functions, which makes them conservative but with larger signatures. PQC keys and signatures are larger than ECC ones, which affects protocols and constrained devices.
What Is Hybrid Key Exchange?
Hybrid key exchange combines a classical algorithm (X25519) with ML-KEM, so the connection stays secure as long as either one remains unbroken. Chrome enabled a hybrid Kyber key exchange in 2024 and moved to the standard ML-KEM version, X25519MLKEM768, as Google described; Firefox and major CDNs also support it. The IETF is standardising the approach in its hybrid design draft.
How Can You Try PQC with OpenSSL?
OpenSSL 3.5 (April 2025) added ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA. With OpenSSL 3.5 or later:
openssl version # must be 3.5 or later
openssl list -kem-algorithms | grep -i mlkem
openssl list -signature-algorithms | grep -i ml-dsa
# Generate an ML-DSA-65 key, sign and verify a file
openssl genpkey -algorithm ML-DSA-65 -out mldsa.key
openssl pkey -in mldsa.key -pubout -out mldsa.pub
openssl pkeyutl -sign -inkey mldsa.key -in report.pdf -rawin -out report.sig
openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey mldsa.pub -in report.pdf -rawin -sigfile report.sig
# Test a hybrid TLS key exchange against a server that supports it
openssl s_client -connect www.google.com:443 -groups X25519MLKEM768 < /dev/null 2>/dev/null | grep -i "group"
How Should Organisations Prepare?
- Inventory: list where RSA and ECC are used: TLS, VPNs, SSH, code signing, PKI, databases, hardware tokens.
- Prioritise: systems protecting long-lived secrets and external-facing key exchange first.
- Ask vendors for PQC roadmaps, as the joint CISA, NSA and NIST quantum-readiness factsheet recommends.
- Build crypto-agility: avoid hard-coded algorithms so they can be swapped.
- Pilot hybrid TLS on internal services and measure performance.
- Follow the transition timeline in NIST IR 8547.
WebAsha offers cryptography and PKI training.
References
Frequently Asked Questions
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