Top 10 Active Directory Attacks: Detection Events and Mitigations
The ten Active Directory attack methods defenders see most are Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, password spraying, LLMNR and NBT-NS poisoning, pass-the-hash, credentials left in Group Policy or scripts, domain reconnaissance, DCSync, NTDS.dit theft and golden tickets.
Topic: Active Directory & Identity Security in Cybersecurity & Ethical Hacking · Explainer
Quick answer: The ten Active Directory attack methods defenders see most are Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, password spraying, LLMNR and NBT-NS poisoning, pass-the-hash, credentials left in Group Policy or scripts, domain reconnaissance, DCSync, NTDS.dit theft and golden tickets. Each maps to a MITRE ATT&CK technique and leaves traces in Windows security logs, such as event 4769 for unusual service ticket requests or 4662 for directory replication. Most are blocked by strong service account passwords and AES encryption, MFA, disabling legacy name resolution, unique local admin passwords, tiered administration and tight control of replication rights.
Key takeaways
- Most AD attacks abuse normal features such as Kerberos, NTLM and replication.
- Each method has a MITRE ATT&CK ID that links it to detection guidance.
- Domain controller audit policy must be configured to capture the right events.
- Service account hygiene and local admin password rotation close many paths.
- Testing these techniques requires written authorisation from the system owner.
Table of Contents
- Why Is Active Directory Such a Common Target?
- How Do Kerberoasting and AS-REP Roasting Work?
- How Do Password Spraying and LLMNR Poisoning Give Attackers a Foothold?
- How Do Pass-the-Hash and Exposed Credentials Enable Lateral Movement?
- How Do DCSync, NTDS.dit Theft and Golden Tickets Lead to Domain Compromise?
- Which ATT&CK IDs and Windows Events Help Detect Each Attack?
- Which Mitigations Stop Most of These Attacks?
- References
Why Is Active Directory Such a Common Target?
Active Directory controls who can sign in to what across most Windows networks. The joint guidance Detecting and Mitigating Active Directory Compromises, led by Australia's ASD ACSC with CISA, NSA and other partners, covers 17 common techniques. Ten are explained here for defenders.
How Do Kerberoasting and AS-REP Roasting Work?
Kerberoasting (T1558.003): any domain user can request a service ticket for an account with a service principal name. Part of that ticket is encrypted with the service account's password hash and can be cracked offline. Weak passwords and RC4 encryption make this easy.
AS-REP roasting (T1558.004): accounts with Kerberos pre-authentication disabled return data that can also be cracked offline, without the attacker needing any password first.
How Do Password Spraying and LLMNR Poisoning Give Attackers a Foothold?
Password spraying (T1110.003) tries one or two common passwords against many accounts, staying under lockout thresholds. LLMNR and NBT-NS poisoning (T1557.001) abuses fallback name resolution: when a computer cannot resolve a name through DNS, it asks the local network, and an attacker on that segment can answer and capture authentication attempts.
How Do Pass-the-Hash and Exposed Credentials Enable Lateral Movement?
Pass-the-hash (T1550.002) reuses a stolen NTLM hash to authenticate without knowing the password. Shared local administrator passwords make one stolen hash work on many machines. Credentials in Group Policy Preferences or scripts (T1552.006) are passwords stored in readable files on SYSVOL shares. Domain reconnaissance (T1087.002) uses ordinary LDAP queries to map users, groups and admin paths.
How Do DCSync, NTDS.dit Theft and Golden Tickets Lead to Domain Compromise?
DCSync (T1003.006) abuses replication rights to ask a domain controller for password data, as if the requester were another DC. NTDS.dit theft (T1003.003) copies the AD database file itself, often from shadow copies or backups. With the krbtgt account's secret, an attacker can forge a golden ticket (T1558.001) that grants access across the domain. Each means the domain should be treated as compromised.
Which ATT&CK IDs and Windows Events Help Detect Each Attack?
| Attack | ATT&CK ID | Detection signals |
|---|---|---|
| Kerberoasting | T1558.003 | Event 4769 with RC4 (0x17) tickets; one account requesting many service tickets |
| AS-REP roasting | T1558.004 | Event 4768 with pre-authentication type 0 |
| Password spraying | T1110.003 | Events 4625 and 4771 across many accounts from one source |
| LLMNR / NBT-NS poisoning | T1557.001 | Unexpected LLMNR (UDP 5355) or NBT-NS (UDP 137) replies on the network |
| Pass-the-hash | T1550.002 | Event 4624 network logons using NTLM from unusual hosts |
| GPP and script credentials | T1552.006 | Regular audits of SYSVOL for stored passwords |
| Domain reconnaissance | T1087.002 | Unusual LDAP query volume; access to decoy accounts |
| DCSync | T1003.006 | Event 4662 replication requests from accounts or hosts that are not DCs |
| NTDS.dit theft | T1003.003 | Event 4688 showing shadow copy or database tools on a DC |
| Golden ticket | T1558.001 | Event 4769 with no matching 4768; unusual ticket lifetimes |
Microsoft's documentation for event 4769 flags ticket encryption types other than AES (0x11 and 0x12). Event 4662 appears only when Audit Directory Service Access and object auditing are configured.
Which Mitigations Stop Most of These Attacks?
| Attack | Key mitigations |
|---|---|
| Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting | Group managed service accounts or 25+ character passwords, AES only, keep pre-authentication on |
| Password spraying | MFA, banned password lists, smart lockout |
| LLMNR / NBT-NS poisoning | Disable both by Group Policy; require SMB signing |
| Pass-the-hash | Windows LAPS, Credential Guard, no domain users as local admins |
| GPP and script credentials | Remove stored passwords and rotate any found |
| DCSync, NTDS.dit theft, golden ticket | Restrict replication rights, protect DC backups, tiered admin, reset krbtgt twice after compromise |
Windows LAPS rotates local admin passwords to block lateral movement, and Credential Guard isolates NTLM hashes and Kerberos tickets on endpoints, though Microsoft does not recommend it on domain controllers. Testing any of these techniques needs written permission; in India, unauthorised access can attract action under Sections 43 and 66 of the IT Act, 2000. See also our posts on AD attacks with real-world examples and dangerous AD misconfigurations. For hands-on defence skills, ask about Active Directory security training.
References
- Detecting and Mitigating AD Compromises (joint guidance)
- MITRE ATT&CK T1558.003 Kerberoasting
- MITRE ATT&CK T1558.004 AS-REP Roasting
- MITRE ATT&CK T1550.002 Pass the Hash
- MITRE ATT&CK T1003.006 DCSync
- Microsoft Learn: Event 4769
- Microsoft Learn: Event 4662
- Microsoft Learn: Windows LAPS
- Microsoft Learn: Credential Guard
- Information Technology Act, 2000
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