Top 10 Active Directory Attacks and How to Defend Against Them
The most common Active Directory attacks are password spraying, LLMNR and NBT-NS poisoning, Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, pass-the-hash, DCSync, Golden and Silver tickets, abuse of Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), Group Policy abuse, and exploitation of delegation and ACL misconfigurations.
Topic: Active Directory & Identity Security in Cybersecurity & Ethical Hacking · Tutorial
Also covers: Penetration Testing
Quick answer: The most common Active Directory attacks are password spraying, LLMNR and NBT-NS poisoning, Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, pass-the-hash, DCSync, Golden and Silver tickets, abuse of Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), Group Policy abuse, and exploitation of delegation and ACL misconfigurations. Most start from one compromised user and move towards Domain Admin by abusing weak passwords, excessive privileges and legacy protocols. Defences that block most of them: strong service account passwords or gMSAs, LAPS for local admin passwords, administrative tiering, the Protected Users group, disabling LLMNR and NTLM where possible, hardening AD CS templates, and monitoring the right Windows event IDs.
Key takeaways
- AD attacks chain together: one weak password leads to credential theft and then domain compromise.
- Kerberoasting succeeds only against weak service account passwords.
- Admin accounts logging into ordinary workstations expose their credentials.
- Misconfigured certificate templates can give any user a path to Domain Admin.
- Five Eyes agencies published joint AD compromise guidance in 2024; use it as a checklist.
Table of Contents
- What Are the Top 10 Attacks at a Glance?
- How Do Attackers Get Their First Credentials?
- How Do Kerberos Attacks Work?
- How Do Attackers Move and Escalate?
- How Do Attackers Take Over the Domain?
- Which Events Should You Monitor?
- How Do You Audit Your Own AD?
- What Is the Hardening Checklist?
- References
What Are the Top 10 Attacks at a Glance?
| Attack | MITRE ATT&CK | Main mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| Password spraying | T1110.003 | MFA, banned password lists, smart lockout |
| LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning | T1557.001 | Disable LLMNR and NetBIOS, enforce SMB signing |
| Kerberoasting | T1558.003 | gMSAs or 25+ character service passwords, AES only |
| AS-REP roasting | T1558.004 | Never disable Kerberos pre-authentication |
| Pass-the-hash | T1550.002 | LAPS, tiering, Credential Guard |
| AD CS template abuse | T1649 | Fix vulnerable templates (ESC1 and others), enrolment restrictions |
| ACL and delegation abuse | T1098, T1134 | Review permissions, remove unconstrained delegation |
| Group Policy abuse | T1484.001 | Limit GPO edit rights, monitor changes |
| DCSync | T1003.006 | Restrict replication rights to domain controllers |
| Golden and Silver tickets | T1558.001, T1558.002 | Protect domain controllers, reset KRBTGT twice after compromise |
Technique details are on MITRE ATT&CK.
How Do Attackers Get Their First Credentials?
Password spraying tries one common password against many accounts, staying below lockout thresholds. LLMNR and NBT-NS poisoning answers broadcast name lookups on the local network, tricking machines into sending authentication hashes. Disable both protocols through Group Policy and require SMB signing.
How Do Kerberos Attacks Work?
In Kerberoasting, any domain user requests service tickets for accounts with service principal names; part of each ticket is encrypted with the service account's password hash, which the attacker cracks offline. Long random passwords or group managed service accounts (gMSAs) make cracking impractical. AS-REP roasting targets accounts with pre-authentication disabled, which should never be the case. Golden tickets forge Kerberos tickets with the KRBTGT account's key, giving lasting domain access; recovery requires resetting KRBTGT twice.
How Do Attackers Move and Escalate?
With a password hash, attackers authenticate to other machines without cracking it (pass-the-hash). If the same local administrator password exists on every workstation, one compromise opens them all; Windows LAPS gives each machine a unique, rotated password. Attackers also abuse AD permissions (ACLs), unconstrained delegation, Group Policy edit rights and misconfigured certificate templates, as documented in SpecterOps' Certified Pre-Owned research.
How Do Attackers Take Over the Domain?
DCSync uses replication permissions to ask a domain controller for password hashes, including KRBTGT. Only domain controllers should hold those rights. Once attackers have KRBTGT, they can forge tickets at will, which is why protecting domain controllers and Tier 0 accounts is the priority.
Which Events Should You Monitor?
| Event ID | What it can reveal |
|---|---|
| 4625, 4771 | Failed logons and Kerberos pre-auth failures across many accounts (spraying) |
| 4769 | Service ticket requests, especially RC4 encryption (Kerberoasting) |
| 4768 | TGT requests without pre-authentication (AS-REP roasting) |
| 4662 | Directory replication access by non-DC accounts (DCSync) |
| 4728, 4732, 4756 | Members added to privileged groups |
| 5136 | Directory object changes, including GPOs and ACLs |
| 4886, 4887 | Certificate requests and issuance on AD CS |
How Do You Audit Your Own AD?
# Accounts with SPNs (Kerberoastable) and their password age
Get-ADUser -Filter {ServicePrincipalName -like "*"} -Properties ServicePrincipalName,PasswordLastSet |
Select-Object SamAccountName, PasswordLastSet
# Accounts with Kerberos pre-authentication disabled (AS-REP roastable)
Get-ADUser -Filter {DoesNotRequirePreAuth -eq $true} | Select-Object SamAccountName
# Computers trusted for unconstrained delegation (excluding DCs)
Get-ADComputer -Filter {TrustedForDelegation -eq $true -and PrimaryGroupID -ne 516} | Select-Object Name
# Members of Domain Admins
Get-ADGroupMember "Domain Admins" -Recursive | Select-Object SamAccountName
Free tools such as PingCastle and Microsoft's Defender for Identity reports also highlight these issues. Run them only on domains you administer.
What Is the Hardening Checklist?
- Adopt administrative tiering; Domain Admins log on only to domain controllers and privileged workstations.
- Put privileged accounts in the Protected Users group.
- Deploy LAPS and Credential Guard.
- Use gMSAs for services; disable RC4 for Kerberos where possible.
- Disable LLMNR, NetBIOS and NTLMv1; enforce SMB and LDAP signing.
- Audit AD CS templates and remove dangerous enrolment rights.
- Follow the joint Detecting and Mitigating Active Directory Compromises guidance from ASD, CISA and partners.
Related: unpatched AD flaws. WebAsha offers Active Directory security and red team training.
References
Frequently Asked Questions
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